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I. INTRODUCTION
Every codification should have a chronicler. If nothing else, a
first-hand account describing the work and thinking which went into
a new code preserves an important chapter in the history of a state
and its legal system. Of more immediate and tangible benefit, a con-
temporary explanation of the codification process and the features of
a new code can be of significant help in understanding, using, and
interpreting that code. Vincent Henderson's recent article, The Crea-
tion of the Arkansas Code of 1987 Annotated,' performs this doubly
valuable service for Arkansas and contributes to a small but impor-
tant body of works dealing with state codification efforts.2
This article is designed to complement Mr. Henderson's by offer-
ing some observations, from an academic perspective, about codifica-
tion in general and the Arkansas Code of 1987 Annotated in
particular. It should be emphasized that this article does not purport
to be a complete or definitive treatment of codification. Rather, the
goals here are to provide a general introduction to some basic con-
cepts and to examine a few legal issues regarding the new Arkansas
Code. By and large these issues are related to, and are the conse-
quence of, special problems associated with the transition to a "code"
in a state which for most of its history has relied upon compilations to
provide a usable publication of its statutory law.
II. PUBLICATION OF STATUTES
In order to explain codification it is worthwhile to begin by con-
sidering the need for publication of the acts of a legislature. For prac-
tical purposes the enactment of a new law is only a first step.
1. Henderson, The Creation of the Arkansas Code of 1987 Annotated, 11 UALR L.J. 21
(1988-89).
2. See, e.g., Dowling, The Creation of the Montana Code Annotated, 40 MONT. L. REV. 1
(1979); Oddi & Attridge, The Indiana Code of 1971: Its Preparation, Passage and Implications,
5 IND. LEGAL F. 1 (1971).
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Publication, and publication in usable form, is imperative if there is to
be a workable legal system. (That the laws should be published, of
course, is also a tenet of basic fairness, with definite constitutional
implications.3 )
The legislative process spews out hundreds, and sometimes
thousands, of acts during the course of a legislative session. Collec-
tively, these acts represent substantial changes in a jurisdiction's stat-
utory law. Individually, these acts may be original in form, adding
new law; they may be amendments of existing laws; or they may con-
tain both original and amendatory provisions.4 Publishing these acts
in the form of session laws5 does little to make them a usable part of
the legal system. The session laws are merely bound volumes repro-
ducing the acts passed during each session, and arranging them, usu-
ally, in the order of their enactment.6 Over a period of even a few
decades, the task of finding all the statutory law governing a particu-
lar issue, including all amendments, repeals, and enactments relevant
to the issue, would become impossible. Every volume of the session
laws would have to be consulted. One can best appreciate the enor-
mity of such a task by imagining the problems which one would en-
counter if trying to conduct research on a topic in a large library
which arranged its holdings solely by the dates on which the periodi-
cals and books were published.
A more usable publication of a jurisdiction's statutory law, based
on classification by subject matter, is therefore imperative, and for
every state there is such a publication, in the form of a code or a
compilation of its statutes. 7 At some risk of oversimplifying the mat-
ter, one can thus begin-but not necessarily end-by viewing codifica-
tion merely as one of two basic ways to publish a usable version of
3. See Armstrong v. Maple Leaf Apartments, Ltd., 436 F. Supp. 1125, 1145-46 (N.D.
Okla. 1977) (statute not published in the United States Code), aff'd on other grounds, 622 F.2d
466 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 901 (1980). See generally Murphy, The Duty of the
Government to Make the Law Known, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 255 (1982); Murphy, Effective
Access to the Law, 10 J. OF LEGIS. 313 (1983).
4. A very informal and unsophisticated survey of 100 Acts of the 1983 Arkansas General
Assembly indicates that somewhat more than one-half of the enactments were purely amend-
ments to existing laws, while about 40% contained no amendatory provisions and less than
10% contained both original and amendatory provisions. M. MULLINS, A HANDBOOK FOR
LEGISLATIVE DRAFTERS 147 (1986).
5. IA J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 28.02 (4th ed.
1985).
6. Id. See also M. PRICE, H. BITNER, & S. BYSIEWIcz, EFFECTIVE LEGAL RESEARCH
28-29, 122-23 (4th ed. 1979) (general discussion of session laws) [hereinafter cited as PRICE &
BITNER]; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1230 (5th ed. 1979) (definition).
7. SUTHERLAND, supra note 5, § 28.01, at 468.
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state statutory law. The other way is to publish some form of compi-
lation. As will be discussed in Part III, below, a codification ordina-
rily involves affirmative legislative enactment of a "Code" which
supplants, to a greater or lesser extent, prior statutory law. 8 A compi-
lation, typified by the old Arkansas Statutes Annotated, is merely a
convenient, edited collection of the state's statutory law, and the com-
pilation itself is, at most, prima facie evidence of the law. 9
III. CODIFICATION V. COMPILATION
A. Some History of Codification and Its Americanization
In order to view the Arkansas Code in proper perspective, addi-
tional background information, some of it historical, is needed. Actu-
ally, it may be impossible to explain adequately some aspects of the
concepts underlying the Arkansas Code without a general overview of
codification as it has evolved in this country.
During the first half of the nineteenth century the word "codifi-
cation" denoted the total restructuring of a legal system, and the en-
actment of a comprehensive set of written laws which replaced
virtually all prior law.'0 "Codification" often accompanied political
and ideological movements as part of their agenda. I The revolution-
ary regime in France, for example, tinkered with several abortive
drafts of a code, but it was Napoleon who commissioned the drafting
of the French Civil Code and who overcame opposition to its enact-
ment by the expedient of reorganizing the government in a virtual
coup.' 2 Napoleon's Code served as a model during the nineteenth
century for most of the new countries of South and Central America,
and for Spain, Italy, Holland, Greece, and Rumania, among others.' 3
In Germany, codification was very much a function of that country's
political unification' 4 and supposedly embodied the Volksgeist, or
8. See infra text accompanying notes 71, 81, 111.
9. E.g., Act of Feb. 14, 1945, No. 50, § 4, 1945 Ark. Acts 98, 100. See infra text accom-
panying notes 110-11.
10. See Warthen, The Non-Emergence of the Anglo-American Law Code, 6 LEGAL REF.
SERVICES Q. 129, 134-36 (1986). See generally J. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION
27-34 (1969) (introductory summary emphasizing ideological and historical bases of differ-
ences between continental European codifications and present American "codes").
11. See J. MERRYMAN, supra note 10, at 27-34.
12. Pound, Sources and Forms ofLaw, 22 NOTRE DAME LAW 1, 54-55 (1946).
13. Wagner, Codification ofLaw in Europe and the Codification Movement in the Middle
of the Nineteenth Century in the United States, 2 ST. Louis U.L.J. 335, 342-43 (1953).




German national spirit, among other things. 5 As one writer put it,
there was a "codification movement which conquered all continental
Europe and swept the world in the course of the nineteenth
century."
1 6
The sweep was not complete, however. England and the United
States (except for Louisiana 7) rejected the continental European type
of "codification," which would have supplanted judicially created
common law with an overarching "code" that was comprehensive,
systematic, and pre-emptive."8 Nevertheless, complete codification
pre-emptive of common law had its proponents.
Foremost among these proponents was Jeremy Bentham, the
English utilitarian philosopher whose extreme position probably
harmed the cause of codification more than it helped.' 9 Bentham,
who is generally credited with coining the word "codification,' '20
maintained that a code of laws, based on his utilitarian principles,
could and should be so utterly clear, complete, and self-contained that
interpretation would be unnecessary. The "law" would be found only
in his code. Anything not in his code would not be the law. 2' A
Benthamite code not only would render common law defunct but also
would reduce judges basically to performing the ministerial tasks of
applying the codified laws. If perchance a Benthamite code were un-
clear on some point, a judge would have to refer the issue to the legis-
lature.22 Today, even the contemporary supporters of a Bentham-
style codification concede that the old boy's ambitions in this regard
were unrealistic.23
Many in Bentham's own era regarded him as an eccentric who
spouted gibberish. 24 Also, he was an extremely harsh, unremitting
critic of the law as he found it in late eighteenth and early nineteenth
century England, and there was indeed much to criticize. 25 Educated
15. Warthen, supra note 10, at 136.
16. Wagner, supra note 13, at 340.
17. See, e.g., Morrow, Louisiana Blueprint: Civilian Codification and Legal Method for
State and Nation, 17 TUL. L. REV. 351, 388-90 (1942-43).
18. See Warthen, supra note 10, at 134-36.
19. Morrow, supra note 17, at 382-83.
20. Alfange, Jeremy Bentham and the Codification of Law, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 58, 77
(1969-70).
21. Id. at 70-71.
22. Id. See also Comment, Jeremy Bentham's Codification Proposals and Some Remarks
on Their Place in History, 22 BUFFALO L. REV. 239, 240-42 (1972-73).
23. Bodenheimer, Is Codification an Outmoded Form of Legislation?, 30 AM. J. COMP. L.
15, 27 (Supp. 1982).
24. Warthen, supra note 10, at 141.
25. Alfange, supra note 20, at 58-61.
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as a lawyer, he had a "completely negative attitude" 26 toward the
practice of law. He was a visionary who devoted his life to the cause
of reform.2" Such activities and qualities do not make for instant suc-
cess, or for acceptance of the more radical aspects of a reformer's
agenda for change. Nevertheless, he had his followers and over the
long run considerable influence. Quite apart from the eventual impact
of his utilitarian philosophy, his proposals for many particular legal
reforms gained acceptance. 28 Even as to codification, Bentham's ideas
ultimately met with a kind of limited success in England itself, when a
few statutes finally "codified" some less controversial areas of com-
mercial law.29
In the United States, the early nineteenth century codification
movement generally avoided Benthamite extremes. Actually, Ameri-
can proponents of codification seem to have avoided even mentioning
Bentham, apparently in an effort to keep from "being tarred with a
Benthamite brush."30 Moreover, American codification seems to
have been a "movement" only in the sense that a number of would-be
reformers were traveling in more or less the same general direction.
As a leading authority on early American codification expressed it,
"the American codification movement manifested a diffused expres-
sion of reformist energy rather than a picture of tightly knit organiza-
tional activity."3" The influential early American pro-codifiers had
only a few features in common. For one thing, they were mostly law-
yers or judges. For another, they insisted that the drafting of any
code should be entrusted only to the most capable and learned mem-
bers of the legal profession.3 2 Also, a conservative streak was com-
mon among pro-codification lawyers. "These men were common
[law] lawyers, proposing the legal change in a nonrevolutionary con-
text, not men bent on upsetting the legal order."33 Pro-codifiers, how-
ever, were still a diverse assortment of individuals, ranging from
moderates such as Justice Story34 to the more radical William Samp-
26. Id. at 58.
27. Id. at 61.
28. Id. at 76-77; Warthen, suprv note 10, at 144-45.
29. Warthen, supra note 10, at 144-45.
30. C. COOK, THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION MOVEMENT: A STUDY OF ANTEBELLUM
LEGAL REFORM 75 (1981).
31. Id. at 96.
32. Id. at 79.
33. Id. at 80. Even in Louisiana, acceptance of the European model of codification essen-
tially reflected a conservative outlook, because the legal heritage of Louisiana was French and
Spanish, rather than English common law. See Morrow, supra note 17, at 388-90.
34. C. CooK, supra note 30, at 80.
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son, a Londonderry Protestant Irish lawyer and rebel exiled from
England to America, where he continued to manifest zeal for the un-
derdog by representing the forerunners of labor unions.35 Neverthe-
less, even the "radical" element of the codification movement was
radical only as a matter of degree. "[T]hey did not desire to revolu-
tionize the existing legal equilibrium by completely remodeling ...
fundamental rights and obligations .... The radicals' criticism fo-
cused on procedural aspects of the law and the complexity with which
substantive rights were stated rather than those rights themselves. "36
More significantly, the early pro-codification movement fore-
shadowed the direction which codification in this country ultimately
would take-namely, something well short of codification in the Eu-
ropean or Benthamite sense, and a rather vague, confused something
at that.37 The pro-codifiers' announced concerns were essentially
pragmatic, 38 and shared by most of the legal fraternity-for instance,
simply "keeping abreast of the law" 39 in a period of national change
and rapid development.
To understand these concerns and their role in shaping Ameri-
can codification, one must try to picture the situation confronting the
American bench and bar more than 150 years ago. Today's legal re-
search tools were either non-existent or in their infancy. Reported
cases became available, but there was generally no organizing princi-
ple in their publication, other than chronological. 4° Locating relevant
case precedent involved laboriously combing American case reports,
which tended to include "the opinions handed down in all cases, how-
ever redundant, insignificant, or unique. "' In the domain of statu-
tory law, the situation was hardly better. Most states had little or no
system for organizing a growing body of statutory law in conveniently
retrievable form.42 Although he was from another society and era,
Aristotle could have been describing the situation in the United States
when he (or at least one of his translators) wrote: "in most states,
most of the laws are only a promiscuous heap of legislation. .. .""4 It
was in this setting-widespread confusion and uncertainty regarding
35. Comment, supra note 22, at 256-57.
36. C. CooK, supra note 30, at 84.
37. See infra text accompanying notes 70-87.
38. See C. COOK, supra note 30, at 70, 80-85.
39. Id. at 53.
40. Id. at 50-51.
41. Id. at 56.
42. Id. at 62-63.
43. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 333 (E. Barker trans. 1948).
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what the law on any particular point might be"--that the codification
movement gained a foothold.
Consequently, American codification was remedial, rather than
doctrinal, in its outlook. The influential pro-codification figures were
pragmatic lawyers and judges, whose announced priority was clean-
ing up a messy legal environment.45 They were not theoreticians wed-
ded to some fixed or rigid ideas of what codification should do or be.
"The codifiers improvised their own concept of codification by borrow-
ing selectively and, with equal discrimination, by rejecting a variety of
elements found in the sources available to them."46 For their models,
they even looked to "legal configurations not usually considered
codifications," such as state constitutions and particular pieces of leg-
islation which had been passed to consolidate and improve particular
areas of the law.47 In short, the American codification movement it-
self essentially redefined codification while espousing relatively mod-
est reforms. The most influential pro-codifiers themselves generally4"
departed from the Benthamite and continental European concept of a
comprehensive, pre-emptive "code" which would comprise a near-ex-
clusive source of the "law" and supplant the common law.
None of this is to say that the codification movement could have
been successful if it had been more ambitious, aggressive, and
Benthamite. Codification faced powerful opposition.49 A more ex-
treme posture on the part of the pro-codifiers probably would have
backfired, in much the same way that Bentham's extremism was
counter-productive, 5" by generating even stronger and more effective
opposition.
However, by offering codification as a way to remedy a then-cur-
rent state of confusion and uncertainty in the law, pro-codifiers not
only rendered themselves vulnerable to being co-opted by alternatives
to codification but also risked reducing their cause to the level of a
44. See C. CooK, supra note 30, at 49-63.
45. Id. at 70, 80-85.
46. Id. at 78 (emphasis added).
47. Id.
48. As with any generalization, there are of course exceptions. For instance, Edward
Livingston was more of a Benthamite and more successful in achieving a continental European
style of codification in Louisiana. However, he also was operating with the benefit of a legal
environment where continental European traditions, rather than English-bred common law,
already were dominant. Morrow, supra note 17, at 388-90. More typical of the extreme, but
less successful, pro-codifiers was New York's David Dudley Field. See, e.g., Warthen, supra
note 10, at 150-53, and infra, text accompanying notes 59-64.
49. C. CooK, supra note 30, at 201-02.
50. See supra text accompanying notes 19-23.
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clean-up and repair effort. By retreating from the goal of supplanting
the common law, they risked limiting the role of codification to one of
periodically revising and reworking already-enacted statutory law.
All of those risks came to pass.
The American codification movement-to the extent that it was
a "movement" at all-was co-opted and lost momentum when im-
proved research tools became available, thus alleviating the extreme
confusion and uncertainty which many had perceived in the law dur-
ing the first decades of the nineteenth century. Digests and treatises
proliferated after 1830,-" and "[b]y their numbers and usefulness in
making the law accessible, digests and treatises obviated the pressing
need felt for codified law. Interest in codified law waned as the
number of legal texts increased."52
Ironically, its own success in stimulating and supporting efforts
to clean up and repair defective statutory systems 53 also blunted the
codification movement. The result was "partial codification," an apt
term used by a leading historian of American codification.5 4 For ex-
ample, one of the most extensive repair jobs culminated in the New
York Revised Statutes, prior to 1830. The New York legislature gave
the commissioned revisors great latitude in re-wording, re-working,
and re-organizing the statutes of New York;55 indeed, the New York
Revised Statutes became something of a model for other states, both
as to the procedures for revising statutes and for their substantive pro-
visions.56 Although the New York revisors wrought extensive
changes, the revisors altered only the existing statutory law of New
York. They left the common law intact.57
Other "partial codifications" set the pattern and tone for the fu-
ture of codification in this country. Some states approached the
model of the New York Revised Statutes, but with a less generous
commission to the revisors or a less comprehensive revision. 8 Others
engaged in "partial codification" by revamping only selected statutory
subjects which were most in need of reform. New York itself, for
instance, responded to the efforts of David Dudley Field by enacting
51. C. CooK, supra note 30, at 203-08.
52. Id. at 206.
53. Id. at 137, 167, 178-79.
54. Id. at 209.
55. Id. at 141-53.
56. Id. at 168-70.
57. Id. at 146.
58. Id. at 168-69.
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his Field Code of Civil Procedure in 184859 and his penal code in
1881.' New York rejected Field's other substantive codes.61
(Although a few states west of the Mississippi-California, North and
South Dakota, Idaho, and Montana-adopted some or all of the sub-
stantive Field codes, the state judiciaries in essence converted them
into "partial codifications"6 2 by refusing to give them pre-emptive ef-
fect relative to the common law6 3 and sometimes by more or less ig-
noring them.64)
The net result was a distinctly Americanized-some might say
bastardized-version of codification. Where the states accepted codi-
fication at all, the early codification movement itself fostered a pattern
of "partial codification," either in the form of a "code" dealing with a
particular subject area (such as the Field Code of Civil Procedure) or
in the form of a more comprehensive overhauling of a state's statutory
law. Pro-codifiers themselves seem to have deliberately discarded the
very words, "codification" and "code," in favor of less controversial
terms, still used today, such as "revision," "consolidation," and of
course "Revised Statutes. 65
Basically, codification in America ceased to denote a total re-
structuring of the legal system pre-emptive of common law and be-
came transformed into one of the words used to describe one method
of good statutory housekeeping and maintenance. This transmogrifi-
cation was not necessarily a bad thing, but knowing something of why
and how it occurred should be helpful in understanding some basic
concepts, and confusions, at work today.
B. Codification and Compilation Today
The heritage of codification summarized above helps to explain
some of the basic features of modern American codification-and
statutory law. Those who supported codification were a diverse as-
sortment of reformers, often with moderate goals which were influ-
enced by pragmatic considerations and which were probably adapted
to meet local state conditions, local political forces, and local legisla-
tive pressures. Each state's statutory system evolved more or less in-
dependently, influenced to an indeterminable extent by a host of
59. Id. at 191.
60. Id. at 196.
61. Id. at 196-97.
62. Id. at 198.
63. Warthen, supra note 10, at 152.
64. Pound, supra note 12, at 65-66; see also Morrow, supra note 17, at 403.
65. C. COOK, supra note 30, at 167.
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variables, such as economic conditions, the degree and pace of indus-
trialization, population, demographics, the composition and attitude
over time of the state legislature, and the state bar. Even within a
particular state there might be a rather checkered history of codifying
statutes. Georgia, for example, enacted seven comprehensive codifica-
tions or recodifications between 1868 and 1933,66 a rate of about one
per decade, then waited until 1982 for its next codification. 67 Arkan-
sas, to take another extreme, went for over a hundred years without
even an attempt to do anything more than rely upon a series of digests
and compilations. 6  Thus, any consistency among the various states'
statutory systems is coincidental. Any similarities are more likely to
be the product of drafters' following some available "model" pat-
terned after another state's code or compilation 69 than of any overall
unifying force or strategy.
In sum, there was-and remains-no real standardization of
statutory systems from state to state. As discussed briefly below, this
lack of standardization has resulted in: (1) confusion in terminology
and concepts; (2) variations in the scope and effects of "codes" among
those states where there has been codification in the sense of positive
enactment of comprehensive statutory systems; and (3) some superfi-
cial resemblance between published codes and published compila-
tions, which obscures the differences between the two.
1. Confused Terminology and Concepts
In the first place, the word "code," when used to describe current
American statutory law, not only has drifted away from its continen-
tal European or Benthamite meaning, 70 but also is applied rather
loosely to different kinds of legislative products. There are, for in-
66. Sentell, Codification and Consequences: The Georgian Motif, 14 GA. L. REV. 737,
738-39 (1980).
67. GA. CODE ANN. § 1-1-1 (1982).
68. See Arnold, Statute Revision in Arkansas, 20 ARK. LAW. 121 (1986); Henderson,
supra note 1, at 22. For information on the abortive "Chapters of the Digest" of 1869, an
attempt at codification, see infra text accompanying notes 164-71.
69. See C. COOK, supra note 30, at 168.
70. One staunch modern pro-codifier wrote a scathing denunciation of this development,
criticizing
the great majority of the American law men who glibly use the term [codification]
.... The point cannot be made too strongly that the practice of collecting all of the
related statutes in a field, perhaps even repealing some and revising others in the
process, and then publishing them between the covers of the same volume and calling
the result a 'code' displays utter ignorance and complete miscomprehension of the
fundamental problem at hand.
Morrow, supra note 17, at 404.
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stance, "codes" dealing with particular legal subjects: a Uniform
Commercial Code, a Probate Code, a Water Code, a Criminal Code,
ad nauseam. These "codes" may, or may not, purport to encompass
completely the law on their purported subject in a particular jurisdic-
tion. Then there are codes in the treatise-writer's sense of the entire
or nearly entire body of a jurisdiction's general statutory law, ar-
ranged by subject and affirmatively enacted for the purpose of creat-
ing a comprehensive statutory system.7 Unfortunately, legislatures
do not always heed the textwriters by limiting their usage of the word
"code" to affirmatively enacted statutory publications. A prime ex-
ample is the United States Code. Some volumes or titles of this
"Code" are nothing more than official compilations; others are codi-
fied in the sense that their provisions have been affirmatively enacted
into positive law.72 Further compounding the confusion, privately
published compilations are sometimes labeled "codes." 7 3
In the second place, and coming from the other direction, there
are legislative products which are equivalent to, if not indistinguish-
able from, a "code" in the sense of a comprehensive enacted statutory
system, but which bear a title such as "Revised Statutes."74 Some
precedent or pattern for this was established during the first half of
the nineteenth century in New York, as noted above.75 Thus, not
only is the word "code" loosely used to describe various statutory
products, but different terms are used to describe statutory enact-
ments which properly could be called "codes."76 Simple browsing
71. J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 5, at § 28.02.
72. See 1 U.S.C. § 204, and Preface at VII (1982). See generally J. SUTHERLAND, supra
note 5, at §§ 28.02, 28.04 (discussing official codes and compilations, respectively).
73. J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 5, at § 28.03. One introductory work on legal research
has even gone so far as to state that the words "revisions, consolidations, compilations, and
codes" are terms which "have no definite meanings as applied to a compilation form." M.
PRICE & H. BITNER, supra note 6, at 29.
74. COLO. REV. STAT. § 2-5-101 (1980 & Cum. Supp. 1987); NEB. REV. STAT. § 49-603
(1984 vol. liA).
75. See supra text accompanying notes 54-57.
76. Strictly speaking, a purist could insist that there are some differences between a statu-
tory codification and a statutory "revision." "Revision" sometimes carries the connotation of
a process which goes beyond "codification" by correcting, improving, and rewriting existing
statutory text, rather than simply reorganizing and restating it. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1187 (5th ed. 1979); Choate, The 1947 Codes of Montana, 7 MONT. L. REV. 19, 20 (1946).
However, the same BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, in the usual muddling manner so characteris-
tic of this area, elsewhere defines "code" as "[a] systematic collection, compendium or revision
of laws ...." BLACK'S at 233 (emphasis added).
Nevertheless, any differences between codification and revision appear related to the pro-
cess of production, rather than the end product itself. "Revision" may be used to denote a
more extensive revisory process of statutory repair than "codification" and may involve delib-
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through the statutory materials in a law school library will disclose a
random hodge-podge of terminology on the spines of statutory publi-
cations, which may-or may not-be codifications: Massachusetts
General Laws Annotated; Michigan Compiled Laws Annotated;
Maine Revised Statutes Annotated; Kentucky Revised Statutes; Mc-
Kinney's Consolidated Laws (New York). Dipping a bit deeper into a
particular jurisdiction's statutory publication, one may uncover word
usage which resembles something produced by a kitchen blender.
"The compilation of statutory laws and nonstatutory material pro-
vided for in this article shall be entitled "Colorado Revised Statutes
1973 .... ,"7 And this "compilation" of "Revised Statutes" was en-
acted "as the positive and statutory law of a general and permanent
nature of the state of Colorado .... ",78 Thus, in two sections of these
"Revised Statutes," the publication is referred to as a "compilation,"
is entitled "Revised Statutes," and is enacted with the effect of a statu-
tory codification.
If such slipshod usage never had any consequences, one could
dismiss this criticism of confused terminology as the quibbling of a
bemused academic. Unfortunately, more is at stake than an aca-
demic's concern with niceties of the legal vocabulary. As a matter
purely of common sense, loose usage of language inevitably breeds
confusion in concepts and meaning. Moreover, adverse consequences
are demonstrable in the "real world." At least one state supreme
court in modern times seems to have demonstrated the practical con-
sequences of such confusion when, in the course of holding a statutory
provision unconstitutional, it concluded that the entire Indiana Code
of 1971 was "in reality nothing more than an official comprehensive
compilation. ... ",79 A critic of the court's decision in that case noted,
quite appropriately, the court's failure to comprehend some rather ba-
sic concepts, such as the significance of the affirmative enactment of
the Indiana Code coupled with the Code's explicit (but judicially
thwarted"°) repeal of the source laws on which it had been based.8 1
erate changes in the meaning of statutory text. But the end product is hardly distinguishable-
a comprehensive body of affirmatively enacted statutory law.
In any event, when a leading legal lexicographer fails to maintain precise boundaries
among crucial terms in the vocabulary of statutory enactments, there is further evidence that
confusion in terminology and concept is prevalent.
77. COLO. REV. STAT. § 2-5-101(3) (1980) (emphasis added).
78. Id. § 2-5-121.
79. Indiana ex rel. Pearcy v. Criminal Court of Marion County, 257 Ind. 178, 184, 274
N.E.2d 519, 522 (1971).
80. The Indiana court nullified the Code's repeal of the source law. Pearcy, 257 Ind. at
184, 274 N.E.2d at 522.
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While the court may not have completely trashed years of work
which had been committed to the Indiana Code, reduction to the sta-
tus of official compilation certainly defeated the major purposes of the
Code. 12 Nonetheless, a nagging suspicion arises that the fault, if any,
was not entirely the court's. The court entertained an amicus curiae
brief from the President Pro Tem of the Indiana Senate, who was also
the chairman of the State's code revision commission. 3 If a lengthy
article describing the Indiana Code and co-authored by a leading leg-
islative staff professional is any indication of what went into that ami-
cus brief, the court's failure to comprehend a distinction between a
codification and a compilation becomes more understandable. In a
key section of that article, the authors at least twice characterize the
Code as an "enacted compilation." Initially, the subheading of the
section is entitled "Why an Enacted Compilation was the Solution." 4
Then, in the last paragraph of the section there appears: "to enact
this compilation into law," and "[a]fter the compilation had been en-
acted, actual revision ... could be carried out . . "85
The point of all this is not to criticize the Indiana court, the legis-
lative staff, or anyone in particular. The point is that loose use of
language to describe important concepts inevitably contributes to con-
fusion about the concepts themselves. When a legislative professional
co-authors an article which refers to the professional's own work-
product as an "enacted compilation"-strictly speaking, a self-contra-
dictory termS6 -confusion is not only pervasive but rampant. Such
blurring of the differences between compilation and codification is
clear evidence of both semantic and conceptual collapse. The differ-
ences between a compilation and a codification have become fuzzy
enough 7 without further muddling things by writing about "enacted
compilations."
2. Variations in the Scope and Effect of Codes
Another dominant feature of the non-standardized American
statutory landscape goes beyond the problems of terminology and
81. Dickerson, The Sad Story of Superbill, or What Happened to the Indiana Code of
1971?, 5 IND. LEGAL F. 250, 256-57 (1972).
82. Id. at 264-65.
83. Id. at 252.
84. Oddi & Attridge, supra note 2, at 7.
85. Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
86. See J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 5, at § 28.04; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 234 ("cod-
ification"), 258 ("compilation") (5th ed. 1979). See generally cases cited infra note 113.
87. See infra text accompanying notes 103-110.
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conceptual confusion. There is virtually no standardization regarding
the scope and effect of a codification. One writer put it nicely when he
said "codifications, however, come in many colors. s8 Considering
the almost infinite range of colors, and the subjective aspects of color,
the metaphor may exaggerate somewhat the variations in the scope
and effect of codes from state to state. However, it is extremely diffi-
cult to generalize about the effect of a codification. Too much de-
pends on the variables of judicial precedents and the language of the
enacting legislation itself.8 9 For instance, all provisions in a valid cod-
ification generally have the effect of law.9" But what if the code con-
tains provisions previously held unconstitutional? Answer: it
depends. Of course, citation is hardly needed for the proposition that
the mere reenactment, in a comprehensive code, of an act previously
held violative of the first amendment (or some other substantive con-
stitutional provision) would have no effect, other than wasted ink.
However, a statute may have been invalid because it failed to meet
constitutional requirements as to form or because constitutionally re-
quired procedures for its enactment had not been followed. A statute
invalid on such grounds might, if included in a later enacted codifica-
tion, be a valid, effective provision of the code.9'
In determining the scope and effect of a comprehensive code,
such as the Arkansas Code of 1987 Annotated, the most troublesome
variable is the language of the statutory measure enacting the code.
Again, the lack of standardization has practical consequences. The
wording of the measure enacting a comprehensive code is crucial, but
that wording varies from state to state.92 A court in a state without a
history of codification, such as Arkansas, will find only the vaguest
sort of "black letter" law on the subject and will be unable to obtain
much guidance from the precedents of other states because those
precedents may be based on differently worded enactments. 93 Even if
the wording from another state is similar, the context and legislative
intent may be different, or the precedents of the other state may be the
product of a different jurisprudence or of its own particular constitu-
tional mandates.
Finally, a most crucial aspect of the scope and effect of a codifica-
88. Sentell, supra note 66, at 737.
89. See J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 5, § 28.09.
90. J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 5, § 28.08, at 476.
91. See generally J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 5, § 28.08, at 476-77; 82 C.J.S. Statutes
§ 274, at 458-60 (1953).




tion-its effect on prior statutory law-is likewise confused and com-
plicated by a lack of standardization. What a legislature encounters
here is essentially a disposal problem. A comprehensive codification
is to be enacted, but what is to be done with the pre-existing statutory
law? The purposes behind enacting a comprehensive codification, and
common sense, would indicate that a repeal of prior laws is necessary.
Indeed, explicit repeals are something of a norm in codification.94
However, it is on this issue that codifiers and legislatures some-
times appear to have second thoughts. What if the codification has
omitted or changed some statutory provisions? Like the family en-
gaged in major housecleaning or preparing for a garage sale, some
folks have a natural reluctance to throw away anything, on the theory
that whatever is permanently discarded will be needed a week later.
At a minimum, one wants to go through the drawers and boxes, lest
some hidden valuables be lost. But this can be very time-consuming
and, in the case of statutes, a major and expensive undertaking. The
enormity of the work involved in thoroughly combing through more
than a hundred years of legislation can be best appreciated by skim-
ming a 129-page article describing in excruciating detail the prepara-
tion of the Indiana Code of 1971.91
Therefore, again, there will be considerable variation from state
to state, and from codification to codification. The boldest codifica-
tions will repeal explicitly all prior statutory law which is not in-
cluded in a list of limited and specific exceptions, 96 or will otherwise
seek to enact a complete, self-contained statutory system pre-empting
prior statutes.97 Other codifications are less bold, and some down-
right confusing and contradictory. "All changes made. . . in the lan-
guage ... of any law... now embodied in said codes.. . are hereby
legalized, approved and given validity. Nothing herein contained...
shall affect the existence, validity, or enforcement of any act ... omit-
ted from, or erroneously, or inaccurately set forth in said revision." 98
The net result is that determining the effect of a codification on
prior law usually becomes an exercise in statutory interpretation, with
all of the complexities, uncertainties, and variables involved in such
94. Id.
95. Oddi & Attridge, supra note 2.
96. See J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 5, at § 28.09 (citing North Carolina General
Statutes).
97. See id. (quoting New Jersey session laws).
98. Id. (quoting provisions of the Montana Revised Codes Annotated, which apparently
are not contained in the current Montana Code).
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an enterprise. 99 The judicial outcome may be unpredictable. As
noted by a leading treatise, "The results are not always certain even
under explicit repealers, for courts do not always obey their literal
mandates.""°
In any event, there are considerable variations from state to state
in the language used to enact a comprehensive codification and, con-
sequently, considerable variation from state to state in the effects of a
codification. Legislatures have broad discretion in this regard, and
occasionally a legislative body even dictates that prior law will control
if the text of a codification is inconsistent with prior law.' 0 ' As dis-
cussed later in this article, the measure which enacted the Arkansas
Code of 1987 Annotated resembles this category of legislation.10 2
3. The Narrowing of Differences Between Codes
and Compilations
A third major consequence of our American codification heritage
has been a narrowing of the differences between codifications and
compilations. In part, some of this narrowing is attributable to indis-
criminate use of the words "code" and "compilation," as previously
discussed.0 3 Even the distinction between a "code" as affirmatively
enacted legislation and a "compilation" as an un-enacted publication
sometimes gets blurred.' °4
However, there are other reasons, stemming from our statutory
heritage, for the narrowed differences between codes and compila-
tions. When the nineteenth century American legal reformers used
partial codification to remedy some of the problems created by a con-
fused statutory environment, 05 codification underwent a semantic
transformation and largely ceased to embody the goal of a complete,
comprehensive system pre-emptive of all other law, including com-
mon law. Rather, codification was relegated to the secondary status
of a tool-a means to achieve the limited, pragmatic, but worthwhile,
purpose of statutory reform.
As a result, American codifications have come to serve essen-
tially the same purpose as compilations. Both serve as methods of
99. For a brief summary of some of the aspects of statutory interpretation, albeit from a
legislative drafter's perspective, see M. MULLINS, supra note 4, at 30-34.
100. J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 5, § 28.09, at 479.
101. J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 5, § 28.09, at 480.
102. See infra text accompanying notes 132-34.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 70-79.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 83-87.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 53-65.
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organizing and publishing statutory law in usable form,1"6 and both
serve as methods of good statutory housekeeping and maintenance.
Because both serve essentially the same purposes, both will naturally
have certain features in common. Organizing statutory law into usa-
ble form entails organization along subject-matter lines. 107 Good stat-
utory housekeeping and maintenance entails timely revisions of text
to reflect amendments and new provisions. '0 8 Consequently, the form
in which both codes and compilations are published inevitably has
converged, and they have come to resemble each other in their exter-
nal appearance-multi-volume publications organized along subject-
matter lines and supplemented by later updating volumes or by the
lawyer's familiar "pocket parts" to each volume.
Thus to the casual user there may be no obvious differences be-
tween a compilation and a code. They are similar in function and
form. Certainly, the title on the spine or frontpiece of the book is not
controlling, and it may even be misleading, as in the case of the
United States Code, parts of which are still a pure compilation. 0 9
Moreover, the differences between a code and a compilation are
seldom crucial in daily usage or practice. A good compilation is gen-
erally reliable, and few lawyers have the time or inclination to verify
the language of a compilation by checking the session laws. If they
did undertake such a verification, a thorough job would require con-
sulting many volumes of session laws, because it is always possible,
for instance, that the compilation has totally omitted any reference to
an obscure amendment enacted decades ago. The bar, the bench, and
the public rely primarily on whatever publication in usable form is
available, whether compilation or code. However, there are more
risks involved with reliance on a compilation, as will be discussed
below.
C. Significant Differences Between Codification and Compilation
Similarities in function and form tend to obscure some significant
differences of substance between codes and compilations. Compila-
tion by its nature merely takes the multitude of separate "acts" of the
legislature, then edits, rearranges, and publishes them in usable form,
but this publication is never conclusive of what the statutory law is. 0
106. J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 5, § 28.01, at 468.
107. Id.
108. M. PRICE & H. BITNER, supra note 6, at 29.
109. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
110. J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 5, at § 28.04.
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"The law" remains scattered in a succession of individual "acts."
A true codification is enacted as law and puts the statutory law
itself into the form of the text which is published and used."1' This
difference, although subtle, can be crucial over the long term. With
compilation, there is inherently a kind of "gap," which widens almost
every year, between the statutory law as enacted and the published
compilation relied upon in daily use. If nothing else, codification can
narrow the gap between the form in which statutes are enacted and
the form of their publication.
Codification has other advantages attributable to its basic differ-
ences from compilation. Once enacted, a code can simplify statutory
maintenance and housekeeping. For instance, future amendments
should directly amend the code, and new general laws should be en-
acted as new provisions of the code. This is in stark contrast to the
more cumbersome process of compilation. In a compilation, amend-
ments are made to an existing "act," which often was originally
passed decades ago and probably amended several times since. Then,
the amending "act" is edited and published as part-usually a
"pocket part"-of, or supplement to, the compilation."12  At a mini-
mum, the extra steps involved in compilation represent extra possibili-
ties for omissions and errors.
Moreover, errors in the editing necessary for compilations can
have serious legal consequences. Because a compilation itself is not
the law, but, as often described, merely prima facie evidence of the
law, 1 3 the session laws prevail over an erroneous compilation.1 4 In
effect, a compilation is something of a legal time bomb or booby trap.
A party or lawyer relying on the text of a compilation may discover,
too late, that the compilation is wrong. The odds of someone's be-
coming a victim of an error or omission in compilation increase with
every passing year and with every act which is edited for publication.
Nor does this involve merely a matter of some individual losing or
111. See J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 5, at § 28.02.
112. See generally M. MULLINS, supra note 4, at 79-82, 124-26.
113. See, e.g., Coopersmith v. City and County of Denver, 156 Colo. 469, 399 P.2d 943
(1965); Boyd ex rel 2,463 Signatories v. Ford, 133 Ill. App. 3d 626, 479 N.E.2d 337 (1985);
State v. Gute, 252 Iowa 294, 106 N.W.2d 417 (1960) (although entitled "codes," the statutory
publications were compilations because not enacted into law); City of Albuquerque v. Camp-
bell, 68 N.M. 75, 358 P.2d 698 (1961); State ex rel. Murphy v. American Surety Co., 180 Okla.
565, 71 P.2d 745 (1937); 1 U.S.C. § 204(a) (1982).
114. See, e.g., Stephan v. United States, 319 U.S. 423, 426 (1943); Royer's Inc. v. United
States, 265 F.2d 615 (3d Cir. 1959); Peart v. Motor Vessel Bering Explorer, 373 F. Supp. 927
(D. Alaska 1974); Bramblett v. Lee, 162 Ind. App. 654, 320 N.E.2d 778 (1974); Orton v.
Adams, 21 Utah 2d 245, 444 P.2d 62 (1968).
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winning a lawsuit. The interests at stake are larger. There is always
the danger that a pivotal provision published in a compilation relied
on by a considerable part of the private or public sector in the state
will turn out to be erroneous, causing substantial disruption to ex-
isting economic, commercial, or other relationships.
Perhaps most importantly, compilations sooner or later reach a
kind of saturation point, or point of diminishing returns. There may
be limits as to how long a statutory system can be credible if the
"law" resides in a series of uncoordinated enactments stretching back
for several generations, while those who use the law are forced to rely
on a published compilation which does not even purport to be "the
law." To say that "the law" is in one source, but you really must rely
on another source, which is not the law, comes out sounding a bit
weird. It is like being given a road map and being told that this map
is just a composite of three or four old maps. Some of those roads
may not be there anymore, and there may be some new roads that are
not on it. After a century or so of compilations prepared by individu-
als of differing competence and reliability, the inevitable errors and
omissions accumulate. Flaws in organization are compounded with
the passage of time, or parts of the original organizational scheme of a
compilation become obsolete. A day may come, as one commentator
described the Arkansas situation, when "the state's statutory law is in
chaos."' 15
At such a stage, there are two basic alternatives-an improved
updated compilation or a codification. Arkansas opted for codifica-
tion, after a long history of compilations and digests.
The remainder of this article will examine several aspects of, and
issues related to, that codification. To begin with, some introductory
observations will note a few of the ways in which the Arkansas Code
of 1987 Annotated (hereinafter, Arkansas Code, or Code) shares the
general American heritage of codification discussed in the preceding
portions of this article. Next, the special problems involved in a tran-
sition from almost 150 years of compilations to a modern codification
will be emphasized. Those problems of transition will provide, di-
rectly or indirectly, something of a recurring theme underlying much
of what follows, although a few pages will be devoted to a slight de-
tour discussing the validity of the Code. Finally, the concluding part
of this article stresses the need for a continuing commitment to main-
taining and updating the Code, so that the problems which led to its
preparation and enactment do not recur.
115. Arnold, supra note 68, at 121.
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IV. FROM COMPILATIONS TO CODIFICATION: SOME
OBSERVATIONS ON THE ARKANSAS CODE
OF 1987 ANNOTATED
A. Introductory Observations
After nearly 150 years of relying on digests and compilations to
provide a usable publication of the state's statutory law,116 Arkansas
was long overdue for a major overhaul. Mr. Henderson's article sum-
marizes the relevant history and mentions some of the problems
which had developed with the Arkansas Statutes Annotated." 7 He
also indicates that the codification process uncovered more than 200
acts or parts of acts which had been omitted from compilations since
1907.118 This fact itself speaks several volumes about the condition of
Arkansas statutory law on the eve of codification.
Nor is Mr. Henderson alone in discovering omissions from prior
compilations. As recently as 1987, the Arkansas Court of Appeals
called attention to some eleven words which had been omitted from
one section of the compilation of an important workers' compensation
measure originally enacted in 1939.119 The court stated: "It appears
likely that in compilation the underlined language was inadvertently
omitted. Although the meaning of the statute as it is presently
worded is clear enough to be applied, the inadvertent omission could
cause confusion." 120 This should dispel any notion that compilation
errors and omissions in Arkansas were limited to obscure or insignifi-
cant acts of no importance to the public or the legal system.
The Arkansas Code of 1987 Annotated therefore falls squarely
within the pattern established by our American codification heritage.
Typically, the Arkansas Code was developed in response to the need
for improved and more accurate publication of the state's statutes.12 1
The Arkansas Code also shares the American codification heri-
tage in other respects. To a minor degree, the general heritage of con-
fusing terminology 122 is reflected in a few provisions of the
authorizing and implementing acts, and in one provision of the Code
itself. Act 641 of 1983,123 describing the powers of the Statute Revi-
116. See Henderson, supra note 1, at 22. As Mr. Henderson indicates, the term "digest"
denotes, for practical purposes, a publication equivalent to a compilation. Id.
117. Id. at 23-24.
118. Id. at 28-29.
119. Washington County v. Ford, 21 Ark. App. 206, 730 S.W.2d 515 (1987).
120. Id. at 209, 730 S.W.2d at 517.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 42-44.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 70-79.
123. Act of Mar. 22, 1983, No. 641, 1983 Ark. Acts 1394.
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sion Commission, refers to "the publication of compilations, recompi-
lations, revisions, codifications or recodifications."' 124 Act 267 of
1987,125 the measure which enacted the Code, refers to "compilation,
revision, or both" in describing laws enacted prior to the Code.
126
The Code itself states a legislative intent to create "a recodification,
revision, modernization, and reenactment."1 27 Because the terminol-
ogy for identifying different varieties of statutory products is confused
and far from standardized,128 there may be contexts, such as those
above, where as a matter of self-defense in draftsmanship several
terms are used in descriptions or authorizations to help reduce the
possibilities of a limiting or narrow judicial interpretation.
Quite commendably, however, the Code's drafters keep such
word-strings to a minimum. Overall, the Code's internal references to
itself generally use the word "code" or "codification," 129 in contrast
to the muddled drafting in another state's "Revised Statutes" de-
scribed earlier in this article. 130
To a more significant extent, the Arkansas Code and its imple-
menting act reflect certain aspects of our American codification heri-
tage in their method of prescribing the effects of the new Code on
prior statutory law. 13' Most interestingly, the measure which enacted
the Code, Act 267 of 1987,132 puts Arkansas among those jurisdic-
tions which deal with discrepancies between a new codification and
prior statutory law by resolving discrepancies in favor of prior statu-
tory law. 133 Act 267 accomplishes this by exempting from repeal any
prior statutory law which was improperly omitted or changed dur-
ing-at a minimum-the process of codification.' 34 However, as dis-
cussed later,'35 this exemption from repeal is so broadly phrased that
124. Id. § 2, at 1396.
125. Act of Mar. 17, 1987, No. 267, 1987 Ark. Acts 734 (Adv. Leg. Ser.).
126. Id. § 4(b)(2), at 736 (codified in ARK. CODE ANN. § 1-2-103 (1987)).
127. ARK. CODE ANN. § 1-2-101(a) (1987).
128. See supra text accompanying notes 70-79.
129. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 1-2-102 to -118 (1987).
130. See supra text accompanying notes 77-78.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 89-100. It also should be noted here that the Code
contains provisions dealing with the effect of the Code on various particular categories of prior
legislation, such as validating and curative acts, ARK. CODE ANN. § 1-2-104 (1987), and acts
dealing with appropriations and compensation, ARK. CODE ANN. § 1-2-105 (1987).
132. Act of Mar. 17, 1987, No. 267, 1987 Ark. Acts 734 (Adv. Leg. Ser.) (reprinted in 1
ARK. CODE ANN. xix-xxi (1987)).
133. See J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 5, § 28.09, at 480.
134. Act of Mar. 17, 1987, No. 267, § 4(b), (c), 1987 Ark. Acts 734, 736 (Adv. Leg. Ser.)
(codified in ARK. CODE ANN. § 1-2-103(a), (b) (1987)).
135. Infra text accompanying notes 184-233.
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its effects may involve some of the more immediate and confusing
issues which could arise under the Code.
B. Special Aspects of Transition in Arkansas
Arkansas, while not unique in the length of time it had relied on
compilations, 136 does have some special problems which flow from en-
acting a codification after almost 150 years of depending on compila-
tions to provide a usable publication of the state's statutes. The
general problems of making the transition from compilation to codifi-
cation are intensified in a state which has become accustomed to an
entrenched series of compilations. For such a state, codification rep-
resents an abrupt break from the past, and there is no history or tradi-
tion of codification in the state to provide a reassuring cushion of
familiarity. Nor are the problems of transition under such circum-
stances limited to matters of psychological response to the unfamiliar.
A state which has no real history of codification has no experience in
preparing a true codification. Likewise, there will be only sparse judi-
cial precedents in that state to provide any relevant guidance to
lawmakers and drafters."3 7 Most crucially, a state in Arkansas' posi-
tion cannot expect to catch up with almost 150 years of acts and com-
pilations and achieve a perfect codification overnight, or even after
several years of careful preparatory work. Codifying 150 years of
statutory production is a massive undertaking. The editorial task
alone is formidable. Generations of uncoordinated enactments and
obsolete terminology must be editorially molded into a coherent, com-
prehensive whole.' Apart from formidable editorial tasks, the
codifiers are likely to encounter substantial gaps between the session
laws and the law as published in several generations of compilations.
Accordingly, a state undertaking its first effective codification in al-
most 150 years almost inevitably will produce a code which is subject
to criticisms and challenges. Before pouncing on particular perceived
shortcomings, however, would-be critics should be reminded of the
sign above the piano in the old Western saloon: "Don't shoot the
piano player. He's doing the best he can." Some discords in the
state's first modem codification are foreseeable.
136. See, e.g., Oddi & Attridge, supra note 2; Phillips, Tennessee Code Annotated, 23
TENN. L. REV. 268 (1954).
137. See infra text accompanying notes 155-56.
138. See Henderson, supra note 1, at 36.
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C. The Enacting Legislation
Act 267 of 1987,139 the measure which enacted the Arkansas
Code,, is conveniently reprinted in the Code itself."4  A brief sum-
mary of this Act may help in understanding a few of the complexities
and problems encountered, and some of the decisions made, in the
process of converting from a compilation to a codification.
First, there is the title of the Act, which explicitly states that this
is "AN ACT TO ADOPT THE ARKANSAS CODE OF 1987 AS
THE STATUTE LAW OF THE STATE OF ARKANSAS ....
Then a fairly long preamble follows. Legalistically, neither a title nor
a preamble is part of an act, but both are helpful and can be consid-
ered in interpreting it.' 4 2 The preamble to Act 267 essentially recites
some of the historical background of the Code, noting, among other
things: (1) that the Arkansas Statutes Annotated "have been in use
for forty years, twenty-four years longer than any previous digest of
Arkansas statutes;" (2) that the General Assembly by Act 641 of 1983
had authorized the preparation of a code, "but without changing the
substance or meaning of any provision of the statutes... ;" and (3) that
the Code has been prepared for submission to the General Assem-
bly.143 Section 1 of Act 267 disposes of the easiest part of the legisla-
tive task by affirmatively enacting the Code, which was "attached to
... and expressly made a part of"'"4 Act 267 itself. The legislature
also specified an effective date of midnight, December 31, 1987, in
both section 1 and section 2.
The major problems of dealing with various contingencies relat-
ing to transition begin at section 3, which involves a contingency that
could arise in any codification-the effect of the codification on other
acts passed during the same session at which the Code is enacted.
This presents a kind of chicken-and-egg situation. Because a codifica-
tion ordinarily will have repealing effect on the statutory laws which it
replaces, 45 and because the Arkansas Code would not take effect un-
til 1988, acts passed during the same session but before the Code's
effective date could have been in something of a conceptual twilight
139. Act of Mar. 17, 1987, No. 267, 1987 Ark. Acts 734 (Adv. Leg. Ser.).
140. 1 ARK. CODE ANN. xix (1987).
141. Id.
142. See MULLINS, supra note 4, at 86.
143. Act of Mar. 17, 1987, No. 267, Preamble, 1987 Ark. Acts 734 (Adv. Leg. Ser.) (re-
printed in 1 ARK. CODE ANN. xix (1987) (emphasis added)).
144. Act of Mar. 17, 1987, No. 267, § 1, 1987 Ark. Acts 734, 735 (Adv. Leg. Ser.).
145. Act of Mar. 17, 1987, No. 267, § 4(b), 1987 Ark. Acts 734, 736 (Adv. Leg. Ser.). See
J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 5, § 28.08, at 477.
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zone. Those acts were not contained in the measure enacting the
Code itself, and most of them already would have taken effect before
the Code's 1988 effective date. How could they be made part of the
Code? Does the Code's repealing effect apply to those acts which be-
came law prior to the effective date of the Code? Without some ex-
plicit statutory provision, their status might be unclear or arguable.
Of course, there are a number of possible strategies for handling
the general problem of other legislation passed during the same ses-
sion that a code is enacted. One possibility might be to avoid the
problem entirely by enacting the code after a substantial recess or dur-
ing a special session, so that the measures passed during the regular
session could be included physically in the code. Or, the codification
bill might be the very first measure enacted at the start of the session,
with no delayed effective date, and with all other measures drafted
that session as part of the new code. 4 6 In other words, provisions
such as section 3 of Act 267 must be tailored to conform with the
timing and strategy for the enactment of the codification itself. This
timing and strategy may depend in turn upon such factors as state
constitutional limits on the legislature 4 7 and political considerations.
So, there is no simple, neat, standardized way to draft such a provi-
sion. Because the legislature enacted the Code during the regular ses-
sion, section 3 of Act 267 provided both for insulation against the
repealing effect of the Code and for the later incorporation into the
Code of other legislation passed during the regular session.
Section 4(a) involves another problem of fitting the Code into the
existing legal system. This provision deals with the specialized issue
of rules relating to judicial procedures.141
With section 4(b) of Act 267, however, the problems become
more acute and the issues more delicate. What is to be done with 150
years of prior statutory law? Section 4(b) begins with a broad repeal
of all statutes of a general and permanent nature 49 in effect on De-
cember 31, 1987, then proceeds to make exceptions. The first excep-
tion is fairly routine, a provision exempting from repeal anything
which is expressly continued by specific provisions of the Code. This
146. See Oddi & Attridge, supra note 2, at 96-98.
147. See, e.g., Wells v. Riviere, 269 Ark. 156, 599 S.W.2d 375 (1980).
148. Other saving provisions and provisions dealing with various contingencies are also
contained in the Code itself. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 1-2-104 to -112 (1987).
149. The "general and permanent nature" language is something of a term of art designed
to exclude such measures as appropriation acts and the scattering of old special and local acts
which are still in effect. For a general discussion of special and local acts in Arkansas, see
MULLINS. supra note 4, at 61-66.
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should assure that any Code language preserving particular categories
of prior enactments from repeal' 1 0 will override the more general re-
pealing language of section 4(b).
The other two exceptions from repeal in section 4(b) are more
complex in language and concept. The repealing effect of Act 267 and
the Code does not extend to prior statutory provisions which have
been:
(2) Omitted improperly or erroneously as a consequence of
compilation, revision, or both, of the laws enacted prior to the
Code, including without limitation any omissions that may have
occurred during the compilation [,] revision, or both, of the laws
comprising the Code; or
(3) Omitted, changed, or modified by the Arkansas Statute
Revision Commission, or its predecessors, in a manner not author-
ized by the laws or the constitutions of Arkansas in effect at the
time of the omission, change, or modification.
(c) In the event one of the exceptions in subsection (b)
should be applicable, the law as it existed on December 31, 1987,
shall continue to be valid, effective, and controlling.' 51
As described by Mr. Henderson, these provisions are a safeguard
against unintentional changes which might occur in the substance or
meaning of prior law as a consequence of the editorial phase of the
codification process, and an effort to prevent editorial changes from
having "any legal effect." 152 However, section 4(b) literally could ap-
ply to any enactments which have ever been improperly or errone-
ously omitted--or changed without authority-as a consequence of
any prior compilation in the history of Arkansas. A collateral effect
of this provision might be, if interpreted too literally, the preservation
of an inchoate body of non-code statutory law which prevents the
Arkansas Code from being a self-contained, totally comprehensive,
and authoritative codification.1 3
The remaining provisions of Act 267 deal with various technical
and housekeeping matters. For instance, section 6 provides for cor-
rection of typographical errors and kindred clerical mistakes in the
Code before actual publication in final form.
150. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 1-2-104, -105.
151. Act of Mar. 17, 1987, No. 267, § 4(b), (c), 1987 Ark. Acts 734, 736 (Adv. Leg. Ser.)
(reprinted in 1 ARK. CODE ANN. xx-xxi (1987) and codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 1-2-103
(1987) (with comma inserted)).
152. Henderson, supra note 1, at 43-44.
153. See infra text at 321.
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D. The Validity of the Arkansas Code
1. Validity in General
The most basic issue concerning the Arkansas Code is its consti-
tutional validity as an exercise of legislative power. Apart from the
first collection of statutes enacted after statehood (the 1838 Revised
Statutes154) and the largely aborted "Chapters of the Digest,"' 5 5 noth-
ing resembling a codification along the lines of the Arkansas Code has
ever been enacted in the history of this state. Predictably, Arkansas
Supreme Court precedents relating to the validity of a codification are
virtually nonexistent. In fact, the only colorably relevant case, Vin-
sant v. Knox, 156 turns out to have very little bearing on the validity of
the Arkansas Code. 157
The basic validity of the Arkansas Code therefore should turn
upon general principles and upon any limitations imposed on the
General Assembly by the Arkansas Constitution. As far as general
principles are concerned (to the extent that there are hornbook princi-
ples in an area of the law so dependent upon the variables of particu-
lar legislative language used in particular enactments), those
principles indicate that the Code was validly enacted by Act 267 of
1987. The power to codify is inherent in a legislature.' Likewise,
the power to enact provisions such as section 4(b) of Act 267, specify-
ing the effect of a codification on prior law, seems well-established.' 59
As far as state constitutional requirements are concerned, Act 267 on
its face enacts the Code itself as part of Act 267, which has an enact-
ing clause and was introduced in the form of a bill. '" Unless there is
some latent defect, such as a failure of the Journals to record the ayes
and nays,'61 the Code itself seems to be unimpeachably valid.
2. Two Specters: Vinsant and the Indiana Code of 1971
At this juncture, however, it is advisable to make a slight detour
related to the validity of the Code. The first leg of this detour involves
the Arkansas case Vinsant v. Knox, 16 2 and the second involves the
demise of the Indiana Code of 1971.
154. Arnold, supra note 68, at 121; Henderson, supra note 1, at 21-22.
155. Henderson, supra note 1, at 22-23.
156. 27 Ark. 266 (1871).
157. See infra text accompanying notes 164-79.
158. J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 5, at § 28.05.
159. Id. at § 28.09.
160. See ARK. CONST. art. V, §§ 19, 21.
161. E.g., Niven v. Road Improvement Dist. No. 14, 132 Ark. 240, 200 S.W. 997 (1918).
162. 27 Ark. 266 (1871).
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Vinsant appears to be the only Arkansas Supreme Court case
dealing with an attempt to enact a codification, or at least the
equivalent of a codification. Some question regarding Vinsant's possi-
ble effect on the validity of the Arkansas Code arises because Vinsant
sometimes is cited to support the contention that a code may be inva-
lid if the drafters who prepare the codification exceed their authority
by adding new laws or omitting laws which had not been repealed.' 63
Vinsant does not support such a contention. In order to dispel any
lingering doubts about the effect of this case on the Arkansas Code, a
brief discussion of Vinsant is appropriate.
Vinsant was a post-Civil War case involving a claim against an
estate.164 After addressing the interesting but (for our purposes) irrel-
evant issue of the validity of governmental actions taken while Arkan-
sas had been in a state of secession, 161 the court confronted the issue
of a direct and definite conflict between the statutory law as reflected
in Gould's Digest and the more recent "Chapters of the Digest," pur-
portedly enacted in 1869.166 If validly enacted, the Chapters of the
Digest would control the outcome of the case. 167 The Chapters of the
Digest had been prepared, under the authority of the state constitu-
tion then in force, by individuals appointed by the Constitutional
Convention itself; the appointees were to be individuals who were
"learned in the law, [and] whose duty it shall be, to revise and re-
arrange the statute laws of this State .... ,,168 The court gave a nar-
rowing interpretation to "revise" and concluded that the appointees
had exceeded their authority to "revise" because the Chapters of the
Digest contained some entirely new laws. 1 69
However, Vinsant did not invalidate the Chapters of the Digest
on grounds that the revisors exceeded their authority. The only con-
sequence of exceeding their authority was that the constitutional au-
thority for revision could not serve to validate the Chapters of the
Digest. The point is somewhat subtle, but simple. In other words,
the Chapters of the Digest could not be held validly enacted on the
basis of the constitutional provision authorizing a statutory revision,
because they went beyond a mere "revision."170 Instead, their validity
163. J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 5, at § 28.05.
164. 27 Ark. at 267-69.
165. Id. at 269-71.
166. Id. at 271.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 271-72 (quoting ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. XV, § 11) (emphasis added).
169. Id. at 272-76.
170. Id. at 276-77.
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would depend on whether they had been properly enacted. "If valid,
[the Chapters of the Digest] must derive their validity from having
been legally enacted by the General Assembly, as other original stat-
utes."' 7 Vinsant in no way supports any contention that a properly
enacted codification will be invalid if the drafters exceed their author-
ity by making unauthorized additions or changes to, or omissions
from, prior statutory law.
Indeed, Vinsant continues for a goodly number of pages after ad-
dressing the effect of the revisors' exceeding their authority. Under
the State constitution then in force, there was a "single subject" re-
quirement for legislation: "no act shall embrace more than one sub-
ject, which shall be embraced in its title."17 2 Consequently, "the work
of the revisors ... in order to be valid as laws, should have been
regularly and by titles separately enacted, by the General Assembly,
as original statute laws." '73 Still, this "single subject" requirement
did not prove fatal to the Chapters of the Digest. The legislature had
made some colorable effort to comply with this constitutional require-
ment by attempting to enact the Chapters separately, and substantial
compliance was found to be sufficient.' 74 However, the Vinsant court
continued measuring the Chapters of the Digest against several other
constitutional provisions,1 75 until it found flaws which invalidated
most of them.
One fatal flaw for many, if not most, of the Chapters of the Di-
gest was their failure to have a constitutionally required "enacting
clause." The state constitution at that time provided for an enacting
clause: "the style of the laws of the State shall be, 'Be it enacted by
the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas.' ",176 The Vinsant
court concluded that an enacting clause was mandatory, and in strong
dicta it stated that all Chapters of the Digest which lacked an enact-
ing clause would be void. Only a handful of the Chapters of the Di-
gest had the required enacting clause. 177
Vinsant is relevant to the validity of the 1987 Arkansas Code
only in the limited sense that Vinsant embodies the hornbook princi-
171. Id. at 277.
172. Id. at 276 (quoting ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. V, § 22).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 276-77, 281-82.
175. Id. at 280-82.
176. Id. at 282 (quoting ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. V, § 27).
177. Id. at 282-86. The opinion also indicates that several of the Chapters of the Digest
also were fatally flawed because there was no constitutionally required Journal entry showing
the ayes and nays on final passage. Id. at 279-280.
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ple that a codification can have the force of law only if it is enacted in
compliance with constitutionally mandated requirements for passage
of legislation generally.' 78 Vinsant itself did not invalidate the Chap-
ters of the Digest because of changes, omissions, or additions made by
the revisors, so Vinsant is irrelevant to any challenges which might be
based on purportedly unauthorized changes made in prior law by the
1987 Code. Vinsant's discussion of separate enactment of the various
Chapters of the Digest likewise is irrelevant to the Code because,
under our present Arkansas Constitution, there is no "single subject"
requirement for general legislation. 179 Unlike most of the Chapters of
the Digest, Act 267 has an enacting clause. Vinsant therefore seems
marginally relevant, at best, to the validity of the Arkansas Code.
The second leg of the present detour involves the Indiana Code
of 1971. However, the fate of the Indiana Code of 1971180 does not
provide much ammunition for challenges to the validity of the Arkan-
sas Code. The Indiana Supreme Court decision demoting the Indiana
Code to the status of an official compilation is irrelevant, because the
decision hinged solely on that state's constitutional "single subject"
rule.1 8 1 Again, Arkansas has no such constitutional provision appli-
cable to general legislation. 18
2
Neither Vinsant nor the fate of the Indiana Code seem to jeop-
ardize the validity of the Arkansas Code. The Indiana case is irrele-
vant. Vinsant, correctly read, actually supports the Code, so long as
the General Assembly followed constitutionally required procedures
for its enactment.
E. The Effect of the Arkansas Code on Prior Statutory Law
One could write a great deal about the possible effects of the
Code. Any time that a major statutory overhaul occurs, there will be
an abundance of issues-foreseen, unforeseen, and unforeseeable.
However, this article will confine itself to considering the possible ef-
fects of section 4(b) of Act 267.
178. See J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 5, at § 28.07.
179. Ewing v. McGehee, 169 Ark. 448, 453, 275 S.W. 766, 768 (1925). There is, however,
a constitutional provision relating to a "single subject" requirement for special appropriation
measures, which obviously is irrelevant here. See ARK. CONsT. art. V, § 30.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 79-83.
181. State ex rel. Pearcy v. Criminal Court of Marion County, 257 Ind. 178, 274 N.E.2d
519 (1971).
182. See supra text accompanying note 179.
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1. Section 4(b) of Act 267
As mentioned earlier, this provision opens by declaring "[a]ll
acts, codes, and statutes, and all parts of them and all amendments to
them of a general and permanent nature ... repealed unless .... 1
Two of the clauses which follow the "unless" may raise some interest-
ing issues of statutory construction and therefore bear repeating:
unless:
(2) Omitted improperly or erroneously as a consequence of
compilation, revision, or both, of the laws enacted prior to the
Code, including without limitation any omissions that may have
occurred during the compilation [,] revision, or both, of the laws
comprising this Code; or
(3) Omitted, changed, or modified by the Arkansas Statute
Revision Commission, or its predecessors, in a manner not author-
ized by the laws or the constitutions of Arkansas in effect at the
time of the omission, change, or modification. 1
84
If one of these exceptions occurs, the law prior to December 31, 1987,
i.e., prior to the effective date of the Code, will be "valid, effective, and
controlling."' 85
At first blush, and if considered without any knowledge or appre-
ciation of the problems involved with a transition from compilation to
codification, section 4(b) might appear to be odd, inconsistent with
the purposes of codification, and inconsistent with the rest of the Act.
To a certain extent, it may be all of the foregoing. Literally, section
4(b) may have created an anomalous situation. The Code is enacted
affirmatively into law by the first section of Act 267, but, as a conse-
quence of section 4(b), any provision of past statutory law preserved
by section 4(b) trumps the Code.
On its face, section 4(b) seems to be a classic example of trying to
"keep your cake and eat it too." Everything is repealed except for
those provisions of prior law which should not be repealed.
A casual reader might react by concluding that the legislature
cannot have it both ways. The Code either should repeal all general
and permanent statutory measures which are not in the Code, or it
should identify with greater precision those prior statutes which are to
183. Act of Mar. 17, 1987, No. 267, § 4(b), 1987 Ark. Acts 734, 736 (Adv. Leg. Ser.)
(reprinted in 1 ARK. CODE ANN. xix, xx-xxi and codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 1-2-103
(1987) (emphasis added)).
184. Id.
185. Id., § 4(c) (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 1-2-103(b) (1987)).
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be insulated from repeal by section 4(b). After all, one purpose of
statutory codification should be to clarify the law. Section 4(b) de-
tracts from this purpose by at least appearing literally to exempt from
repeal an indeterminate assortment of prior laws and parts of laws
which have only a vague, dual common denominator: their improper
omission as a consequence of prior compilation or revision, or their
unauthorized omission or change by predecessors of the Statute Revi-
sion Commission, during the entire statutory history of Arkansas. If
this is a correct reading of section 4(b), then the scope of the statutory
exemption from repeal wrought by section 4(b) is hardly precise.
Foreseeably, the broad literal scope of these exemptions from re-
peal will send astute legal counsel scurrying to dredge up acts and
statutory provisions from the past which will be offered as "the law"
under sections 4(b) and 4(c) because at some point in Arkansas' statu-
tory history they were omitted from, or changed in, a compilation.
Even if section 4(b) does not spawn excessive litigation of borderline
merit, some testing of its outer limits is quite predictable.
However, uninformed criticism of section 4(b) could easily de-
scend into second-guessing and armchair quarterbacking. Perspective
is necessary for a balanced view of section 4(b) and its effects. In
perspective, and in the larger scheme of things, section 4(b) is far from
being unprecedented, unique, or unjustified.
To begin with, a legislature has the power to provide for what
happens if a codification omits or changes the language of prior statu-
tory law.I 6 Section 4(b) thus falls within a broader category of provi-
sions common in codifications, but far from standardized in scope and
articulation. As a leading treatise puts it: "There is considerable vari-
ety among statutory provisions dealing with this question. The effect
of any code to which such a provision applies can be ascertained only by
examining the wording of the pertinent provision. 187 Moreover, legis-
latures sometimes give
controlling effect to the text of the prior law .... With respect to
the United States Code, for example, an act of Congress provides
that 'in case of any inconsistency arising through omission or
otherwise between the provisions of any section of this Code and
the corresponding portion of legislation heretofore enacted effect
shall be given for all purposes whatsoever to such enactments." 88
186. See J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 5, at § 28.09.
187. Id. at 479 (emphasis added).




Arguably, the treatise-writer quoted above chose a poor example,
because the statutory provision he cites did not pertain originally to a
true codification. Rather, the provision was part of the measure
promulgating the first publication of the United States Code,"8 9 which
at that time was entirely a compilation and only prima facie evidence
of the law. 19o The present effect of the quoted provision on those titles
of the U.S. Code which subsequently have been enacted into positive
law could make for an interesting academic exercise, but one which
would be outside the scope of this article.
However, even for those titles of the U.S. Code which have been
enacted into positive law, Congress has not explicitly or unambigu-
ously stated that all prior statutory law is categorically repealed:
"[W]henever titles of such Code shall have been enacted into positive
law the text thereof shall be legal evidence of the laws therein con-
tained ... ."I91 The extent to which the term "legal evidence" oper-
ates to preempt prior law in case of inconsistency between enacted
code and prior law is certainly not self-explanatory. Indeed, the Stat-
utes at Large (the term used to denominate the federal session laws)
have the same status-"legal evidence of laws" 192-as the positively
enacted titles of the U.S. Code.
Insofar as can be gathered by examining a few of the Congres-
sional measures enacting particular titles of the U.S. Code into posi-
tive law, Congress seems inclined against broad repealing language.
Rather, the pattern seems to be one of including a detailed list of par-
ticular prior acts and statutes which are repealed explicitly.1 93 The
measure enacting title 1 of the U.S. Code contains an interesting vari-
ation of this theme: "The sections or parts thereof of the Statutes at
Large or the Revised Statutes covering provisions codified in this Act
are hereby repealed insofar as such provisions appeared in title 1,
United States Code, 1940 edition, as shown by the appended table
99194
Fortunately, this is neither the time nor the article to attempt a
definitive explication addressing the intricacies of U.S. Code drafts-
manship. Sufficient to say, Arkansas certainly is not alone in drafting,
189. Act of June 30, 1926, ch. 712, 44 Stat. 1 (1926) (reprinted in 1 U.S.C. LXXIX (1982)).
190. Id.
191. 1 U.S.C. § 204(a) (1982) (emphasis added).
192. 1 U.S.C. § 112 (1982).
193. See, e.g., Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-857, § 14, 72 Stat. 1105, 1268-74 (1958);
Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 21, 62 Stat. 683, 862-68 (1948).




with something less than crystal clarity, provisions dealing with the
relationship between a codification and prior statutory law.
Even more directly in point, sections 4(b) and (c) have a very
close counterpart in the current Delaware Code.
All codes . . . and all other statutes, and parts thereof, of a
general and permanent nature in effect on December 31, 1974, are
repealed unless ... (2) omitted improperly or erroneously as a conse-
quence of compilation, revision, or both, of laws enacted subsequent
to the enactment of the Code [of 1953], including, without limita-
tion, any such omissions that may have occurred during the compila-
tion, revision, or both, of the laws comprising this Code, or
(3) omitted, changed or modified by the Revisors, or their predeces-
sors, in a manner not authorized by § 211 of this title. In the event 1
[sic] of the above exceptions should be applicable, the law as it ex-
isted prior to May 13, 1975, shall continue to be valid, effective and
controlling. 195
There are some differences from section 4(b), of course. For instance,
the Delaware exemption from repeal cannot be read as stretching
back into the nineteenth century. (In Delaware, there was an earlier
codification in 1953 which had been held to completely repeal most
prior statutory law196 under a very different and more absolute repeal-
ing provision. 19) However, much of the current Delaware provision's
operative language is almost identical to that of sections 4(b) and (c).
Arkansas, therefore, is not totally unique or unprecedented in its ap-
proach to dealing with discrepancies between the text of prior law and
the text of a codification which makes unauthorized changes or omis-
sions from prior law.
Nor is section 4(b) completely unjustified in its approach when
the choices confronting the General Assembly are carefully consid-
ered in proper context.
To begin with, even if sections 4(b) and (c) mean that errors,
omissions, and changes as a consequence of any compilations, during
the entire history of Arkansas statehood, may affect or nullify provi-
sions contained in the Code today, it still must be recalled that the
Arkansas codifiers were dealing with 150 years of compilations and
enactments. As Mr. Henderson informs us, the research and editorial
process of preparing the Code disclosed some 200 omissions of acts or
parts of acts from compilations since 1907.198 This factor alone is
195. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 103 (1985) (emphasis added).
196. Monacelli v. Grimes, 48 Del. 122, 99 A.2d 255 (1953).
197. See infra text accompanying note 203.
198. Henderson, supra note 1, at 28-29.
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cause for genuine concern and reflects the problems of enacting a cod-
ification after more than a century of compilations. Mr. Henderson's
article also describes the extensive editorial changes and revisions
which were made in the present codification,199 and it is reasonable to
assume that past compilers and digesters, subject to less supervision,
might have taken substantial liberties with text in the name of edito-
rial license.
In brief, the transition to a codification after almost 150 years of
compilations required a choice in some form between: (1) preserving
still-valid but uncompiled or improperly changed statutory provisions
which the codification process still might not have uncovered,200 and
(2) a codification which preempted all such provisions. The General
Assembly in effect already had given a rather firm mandate governing
this choice. The General Assembly only authorized the Statute Revi-
sion Commission to make changes "for the purpose of orderly and
logical codification of acts, and not [to make] any changes in the
meaning or substance of any portion of the Statutes of Arkansas or
any other act.' ' 20 1 A repeal certainly qualifies as a change to prior
statutory law, so the repeal of otherwise-valid statutory law omitted
from, or changed by, past or present compilations would have con-
flicted with this purpose.
Moreover, it is difficult under the circumstances to conceive of
some compromise position between: (1) saving from repeal prior laws
which had been improperly or erroneously omitted from the Code (or
changed), and (2) repealing such laws. One hundred fifty years of acts
with no intervening effective codification represent a continuum of
legislation which might not be susceptible, for instance, to an arbi-
trary cut-off date, such as "all laws enacted after 1907 which have
been improperly or erroneously omitted . .. ."
Although the bolder approach of a more complete and unquali-
fied repeal of prior laws not contained in the Code would have had its
advantages, this approach also has its disadvantages and complica-
tions. The experience of one state which opted for the bolder course
of a more absolute repeal of anything not specifically preserved in or
199. Id. at 27-37.
200. As Mr. Henderson's article indicates, those provisions of prior law which were discov-
ered to have been omitted were included in the Code during the codification process. Hender-
son, supra note 1, at 28-29. However, discovery of those omissions could well have generated
concern that there remained yet-undiscovered omissions and changes.
201. Act of Mar. 22, 1983, No. 641, § 2, 1983 Ark. Acts 1394, 1400 (emphasis added). See




by its code might be instructive. Interestingly enough, Delaware pro-
vides the example. Prior to its current Code, which has a repealer
provision similar to section 4(b),20 2 Delaware had enacted a codifica-
tion in 1953 which contained the following language:
The following laws, unless expressly continued by specific pro-
visions of this Code, are hereby repealed-
1. All prior codes, and parts thereof, and all laws amenda-
tory thereof.
2. All other prior statutes, and parts thereof, of a general
and permanent nature.20 3
The Delaware courts took the Delaware legislature at its word.
Consequently, in Monacelli v. Grimes 2"M editorial changes in language
made by the Delaware codifiers in the 1953 Delaware Code were held
to have altered the statutory provisions for service of process on non-
resident motorists, because those changes had been enacted into law
by the state legislature. Monacelli did not end all litigation and re-
ported cases, however. In Dooley v. Rhodes205 the Delaware Supreme
Court four years later ruled that the omission from the 1953 Code of a
provision limiting the authority of justices of the peace repealed that
provision, leaving justices of the peace free from prior restrictions on
the length of time they could incarcerate individuals who did not pay
their fines. Said the court: "The situation is an anomalous one, but it
is the logical result, as we view the matter, of the error in repealing
§ 4461 of the 1935 Code. Remedial legislation is obviously called for,
but the courts cannot supply it."2" Several other reported Delaware
cases likewise dealt with or touched upon the consequences of the
absolute, clean repeal of prior statutory law.20 7
While the changes wrought by the repealer provision of the 1953
Delaware Code did not throw the Delaware legal system into chaos or
result in an avalanche of litigation, it cannot be said that the near-
absolute repealer created a situation free from problems of statutory
interpretation or litigation. Moreover, the 1974 Delaware Code, with
202. See supra text accompanying note 195.
203. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 103 (1953) (amended, 60 Del. Laws, ch. 56, § 3 (1975))
(codified, as amended, in DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 103 (1985) (the 1975 amendment effec-
tively repealed and replaced the 1953 provision)).
204. 48 Del. 122, 99 A.2d 255 (1953).
205. 50 Del. 479, 135 A.2d 114 (1957).
206. Id. at 486, 135 A.2d at 118.
207. State v. Botluck, 57 Del. 362, 200 A.2d 424 (1964); Application of X-Chequer Inn,
Inc., 229 A.2d 22 (Del. Super. Ct. 1967); Delaware Compensation Rating Bureau v. Gordy, 42
Del. Ch. 446, 213 A.2d 706 (1965).
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its provision similar to that of Arkansas, °8 seems to have generated
only one arguably relevant reported case, and that case did not even
cite the repealer provision of the 1974 Code. There, the omission of a
prior enactment was held to have no effect; the enactment, despite
being omitted from the 1974 Code, was still the law.2' For whatever
reason, and contrary to what might have been expected, the more
complex Delaware provision, which is quite similar to Arkansas' sec-
tion 4(b), apparently has not resulted in a single reported case which
cites that provision, much less engages in interpreting it.
Any lessons to be drawn from the Delaware experience may be
arguable, but the Delaware cases certainly indicate that questionable
omissions and changes may be unavoidable in a comprehensive codifi-
cation, even though they may not have been intended.21° When such
omissions and changes occur, they may be given legal effect by the
judiciary if the measure enacting the code contains a repealing provi-
sion which is complete and absolute on its face. Whether or not the
present Delaware Code repealer was a legislative response to the case
law arising under the more absolute repealer of the 1953 Code, the
fact remains that the present Delaware Code took a different ap-
proach to the problem.
In all likelihood, therefore, neither a complete repealer, nor a
complex repealer provision such as that contained in section 4(b), can
avoid interpretive problems and litigation. Some questions, problems,
or litigation are probably unavoidable, regardless of how the transi-
tion and repealer provisions are drafted.
2. Interpretative Problems Stemming from Section 4(b)
Although sections 4(b) and (c), viewed in proper perspective, are
neither unprecedented nor unjustified, they nevertheless create serious
doubt regarding whether the text of the Code contains all of the gen-
eral and permanent statutory law of Arkansas. The net effect proba-
bly is that Arkansas has two bodies of general statutory law: the
tangible published Code, and the unidentified corpus of unrepealed
law waiting to crystallize after litigation. This inchoate body of non-
Code statutory law could prove troublesome. At the very least, those
who use the Code, relying on its status as affirmatively enacted law,
could find themselves ambushed as a consequence of section 4(b).
208. See supra text accompanying note 195.
209. Elliott v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Delaware, Inc., 407 A.2d 524 (Del. 1979).
210. For an interesting and fairly exhaustive discussion, see Monacelli v. Grimes, 48 Del.
122, 99 A.2d 255 (1953).
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Moreover, section 4(b) could generate some interesting problems
of statutory construction and create a fertile field for confusion. For
example, under what circumstances can it be said that an act or a
provision has been "[o]mitted improperly or erroneously"? 2" To take
only one facet of this one possible example, there are situations where
compilations have omitted, quite properly, the text of a prior act or
provision which has never been explicitly repealed. These situations
arise because a legislature does not always repeal explicitly those pro-
visions of prior law which it intends to supplant with subsequent leg-
islation.21 2 To create a simplified example, assume that a legislature
in 1897 enacts a comprehensive measure regulating pool halls. A dec-
ade later a new comprehensive measure is enacted covering the same
subject. Some provisions in the act of 1897 do not appear in the new
act. It is possible that a repeal by implication of the omitted provi-
sions has resulted.21 3 If so, the compiler properly omitted them.
However, repeals by implication are not favored; the judicial pre-
sumption is against repeals by implication.214 Whether an omission
from the Code is "improper" or "erroneous" therefore might hinge
upon the good or bad judgment of some digester or compiler of a by-
gone era in assessing the rather tangled issues of repeal by
implication.
Fortunately, there are indications in Arkansas case law that the
Arkansas Supreme Court historically has been sensitive to the special
context of repeal by implication which exists when compilers have
omitted prior laws or parts of laws. In Pulaski County v. Downer,21 5
one of the earliest Arkansas cases concerning the effects of subsequent
legislation on a prior statute, the Arkansas Supreme Court indicated
in strong dicta that Arkansas courts would pay considerable deference
to the digest or compilation in effect at the time: "The Digest . . .
prepared by E.H. English . . . were [sic], as such, published by the
authority of the State .... This, at the very least, was a legislative
declaration that there were no other such statutes then in force. 2 16
Still, in Downer, the later act "covered the entire ground [of the ear-
lier statute] and was evidently a complete substitute for that stat-
211. Act of Mar. 17, 1987, No. 267, § 4(b)(2), 1987 Ark. Acts 734, 736 (Adv. Leg. Ser.)
(codified in ARK. CODE ANN. § 1-2-103(a)(2) (1987)).
212. See J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 5, at §§ 23.09, 23.10, 23.13, 23.14.
213. See, e.g., City of Little Rock v. Arkansas Corp. Comm'n, 209 Ark. 18, 189 S.W.2d
382 (1945). See also J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 5, at §§ 23.09, 23.10.
214. E.g., Davis v. Cox, 268 Ark. 78, 593 S.W.2d 180 (1980). See also J. SUTHERLAND,
supra note 5, at § 23.10.
215. 10 Ark. 588 (1850).
216. Id. at 590.
[Vol. 11:285
ARKANSAS CODE
ute."' 2 17 Therefore, when that later act omitted a provision which the
earlier act had contained, the later act had the effect of repealing the
omitted provision. "[W]here the legislature take up a whole subject
anew and cover the entire ground of the subject matter of a former
statute, and evidently intend it as a substitute... the prior act will be
repealed thereby, although there may be no express words to that ef-
fect and there may be in the old act provisions not embraced in the
new."21 About a hundred years after Pulaski County v. Downer, the
Arkansas Supreme Court said much the same thing in another case,
with much the same result, although paying lip-service to the disfavor
in which repeals by implication are held.21 9 "We attach significance
to the fact that the compilers of 'Arkansas Statutes 1947 Annotated'
did not include [section] 3381 ... as a part of our criminal procedure
.... 9"220 Thus, challenges involving omissions by prior compilers, in
the context of possible repeals by implication, have generated at least
some signals from the Arkansas Supreme Court that the challengers
must shoulder a relatively heavy burden of persuasion before the
court will be satisfied that a compiler's omission of a prior law was
improper or erroneous.
It should be emphasized that the foregoing discussion involves
merely one possible type of omission which, if made in the Code,
could turn out to be proper, rather than "improper" or "erroneous."
However, omissions made because of the repealing effect of subse-
quent enactments still might be the subject of litigation which gener-
ates confusion if the courts are not alert.
Other interpretive issues regarding section 4(b) could be raised.
For example, when has an omission been a "consequence of compila-
tion, revision, or both"?22' If not a "consequence" of compilation or
revision, the omission literally does not seem to come within the stat-
utory exception. When has something in prior statutory law been
"changed, or modified.., in a manner not authorized by the laws...
in effect at the time of the ... change"?222 It may be all well and good
to prevent an inadvertently omitted act from being repealed, but to
prevent the Code from having a repealing effect on some prior act
217. Id.
218. Id. at 591.
219. Forby v. Fulk, 214 Ark. 175, 214 S.W.2d 920 (1948).
220. Id. at 181, 214 S.W.2d at 923.
221. Act of Mar. 17, 1987, No. 267, § 4(b)(2), 1987 Ark. Acts 734, 736 (Adv. Leg. Ser.)
(codified in ARK. CODE ANN. § 1-2-103(a)(2) (1987)).
222. Act of Mar. 17, 1987, No. 267, § 4(b)(3), 1987 Ark. Acts. 734, 736 (Adv. Leg. Ser.)
(codified in ARK. CODE ANN. § 1-2-103(a)(3) (1987)).
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simply because there has been at some time in the past an unauthor-
ized change-no matter how minor and immaterial-seems, literally
at least, to be a bit extreme. And what is a "predecessor" of the Ar-
kansas Statute Revision Commission?
223
In short, there are likely to be some interesting, although not
monumental, issues of statutory interpretation arising from section
4(b) of Act 267. The ultimate results cannot be predicted with any
assurance because there are too many variables and imponderables.
To some extent, the effect of section 4(b) depends upon the thorough-
ness with which the codifiers identified and included prior enactments
omitted from the compilations. To some extent, much depends on the
degree to which attorneys in this state will be able to discover bona
fide past omissions and "changes" made by compilers. Ultimately, a
great deal depends on the posture and attitude of the Arkansas
Supreme Court, which has, in the past, displayed some willingness to
presume, in effect, that past compilations published under legislative
authority embody, prima facie, a legislative determination that prior
enactments have been superseded.224
Arkansas courts might further simplify any statutory interpreta-
tion problems raised in connection with sections 4(b) and (c) by ad-
hering to a few general principles of statutory construction. To begin
with, the clauses of section 4(b) which preserve from repeal improp-
erly or erroneously omitted statutory provisions, or provisions
changed in an unauthorized manner, are exceptions from a more gen-
eral statutory rule. They are very close to "provisos" in their scope
and nature, and courts should strictly construe provisos.225 Even if
not regarded as provisos, they are definitely exceptions. The burden
of persuasion in establishing an exception is on the party claiming
that the exception applies.2 26 Moreover, there should be a reasonably
strict interpretation of these exceptions.2 2 7 As a matter of common
sense, the courts should not allow exceptions to erode the more gen-
eral rule which would prevail in the absence of the exception.
In addition, there are strong policy considerations favoring a nar-
row application of these exceptions. The bar, the bench, and the pub-
223. Id.
224. Forby v. Fulk, 214 Ark. 175, 181, 214 S.W.2d 920, 923 (1948) ("attach[ing] signifi-
cance to the fact that the compilers of 'Arkansas Statutes 1947 Annotated' did not include" a
provision of prior law and listed earlier decisions as "Decisions Under Prior Law").
225. See J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 5, at §§ 47.08 to .10.




lic need to be able to rely on the Code as published.22 An expansive
judicial reading of the exceptions created by section 4(b) would not
only encourage litigation, but also undermine the value of having a
codification at all.
Finally, the courts should be sensitive to the legislative intent and
purpose underlying section 4(b). Despite the possible literal readings
that the courts might render, the legislative intent and purpose seem
clear enough. As Mr. Henderson's article suggests, section 4(b) is a
"safeguard,"2 2 9 rather than a trap for those relying on the Code, or a
windfall for those who discover some obscure omission or change.
The purpose of the exception was "to prevent any accidental or unin-
tentional changes in the substance or meaning" of pre-Code law.230
The legislative intention in this respect seems clear enough, based on
legislation authorizing the preparation of the Code231 and the Pream-
ble to Act 267.232 Thus, courts should read section 4(b) as reflecting a
sensible precaution against significant omissions and changes during
the codification process itself, and not as reflecting an invitation to
delve back into the statutory history of Arkansas in a quest for ob-
scure, long-forgotten statutory provisions which arguably supersede
provisions of the Code. As the Arkansas Supreme Court has stated,
"[i]t is the duty of this Court to give effect to the intent of the General
Assembly, even though the true intention, though obvious, has not
been expressed by the language employed when given its literal mean-
ing. '233 In any event, Arkansas courts should give a narrow interpre-
tation to section 4(b), because it is unlikely that the General Assembly
intended for the tail (section 4(b)) to wag the dog.
V. THE FUTURE
Although the Arkansas Code is an important landmark, what
the General Assembly accomplished in the 1987 codification does not
even begin to approach the importance of what happens to the Code
in the future. Arkansas must not allow shortcomings or imperfec-
tions, if any, in the current Code to obscure its significance or deter
continued commitment to codification of the state's statutory laws.
Imperfections may be inevitable when codification occurs after almost
228. See supra text at 303-04.
229. Henderson, supra note 1, at 43.
230. Id.
231. Act of Mar. 22, 1983, No. 641, § 2, 1983 Ark. Acts 1394, 1400.
232. Act of Mar. 17, 1987, No. 267, Preamble, 1987 Ark. Acts. 734 (Adv. Leg. Ser.) (re-
printed in 1 ARK. CODE ANN. xix (1987)).
233. Steele v. Murphy, 279 Ark. 235, 238, 650 S.W.2d 573, 575 (1983).
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150 years of relative neglect and reliance on compilations and digests.
Imperfections can be identified and corrected. Lessons can be learned
from experience. But there is no substitute for commitment. Without
adequate maintenance and upkeep, the Code could become obsolete,
and the far-sighted investment of time and resources made during this
decade could be a pure waste of money.
The enactment of a codification is only a first step. The experi-
ence of Georgia shows that a state can too-easily backslide. Georgia
was one of the earliest states to codify, and for many years it appar-
ently continued to update and recodify its statutory law. Then one
year it stopped. In 1980, a commentator wrote: "For roughly the last
45 years, the Georgia statutory scene has featured both codification
species-a statutorily sanctioned code of 1933, and a supplemented
and 'annotated' code of private publication." '234 Actually, the "code
of private publication" probably should have been characterized as a
"compilation," but the more important point is that a state can wind
up with possibly the worst of both worlds-an outdated, obsolete cod-
ification and reliance on private publishers.
The Arkansas Code contemplates, and itself contains the ma-
chinery for achieving, the goal of timely and systematic maintenance:
(a) All acts enacted after December 31, 1987, of a general
and permanent nature shall be enacted as amendments to this Code
.... If the subject matter of any law is already generally embodied
in one of the titles of this Code or can be appropriately classified
therein, that new law shall be enacted as an amendment to that
title. If it is not possible to classify the subject matter of a new law
in an existing title, a new title shall be enacted containing the new
law . 235
(f) In the enactment of new laws, the plan, scheme, style,
format, arrangement, and classification of this Code shall be fol-
lowed as closely as possible with the result that the Code and all
amendments to it will comprise a harmonious entity containing all
the laws of the State of Arkansas of a general and permanent
nature.236
Failure to make a modest continuing investment in updating and
maintaining a codification would be a classic case of penny-wise and
dollar-foolish. The costs of insecurity and uncertainty flowing from
234. Sentell, supra note 66, at 737.
235. ARK. CODE ANN. § 1-2-116(a) (1987) (emphasis added).
236. Id. at § 1-2-116(f) (emphasis added).
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diminished confidence in the reliability of the basic usable publication
of state statutory law are, of course, difficult to calculate because they
are intangibles. However, the dollar cost of eventual but sporadic
comprehensive revision or recodification can be estimated by conven-
tional methods and has been described as "enormous. ' 237
Prompt and timely upkeep of the Code, whatever the form and
mechanics of the process, should save money in the long run. It cer-
tainly would save wear and tear on the legal system and enhance pub-
lic confidence that the books purportedly publishing the statutory law
of the state for day-to-day use come as close as humanly possible to a
faithful publication of that law.
237. J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 5, at § 28.15.
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